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IMMINENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY: THE U.S. AND U.K.
RESPONSES TO GLOBAL TERRORISM
TODD LANDMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
He who trades liberty for security deserves neither and will lose
both.
-attributedto Thomas Jefferson

The United Kingdom and the United States are two of the world's
oldest liberal democracies, whose political institutions have evolved
and changed numerous times in response to profound historical events
and developments at the domestic and international levels. On the
domestic front, democracy was born of violent political struggles in
both countries through the Puritan Revolution in seventeenth century
England and the Civil War in nineteenth century America,1 where
.
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This article is based on a speech given by Dr. Landman at California Western
School of Law (CWSL) on March 29, 2007. It was delivered as part of the
University of California, San Diego Institute of International and Comparative
Studies and CWSL Speaker Series addressing the High-level Panel Report on
Threats, Challenges and Change. Concurrent with his work on this article, Dr.
Landman was completing an essay entitled The United Kingdom: The Continuity of
Terror and Counterterror,which appears in NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE TERRORISM, edited by Alison Brysk and Gershon
Shafir (2007). Many of the larger conceptual points discussed in this article also
appear in the aforementioned essay.
1. Two comparative historical analyses of the United States argue that the real
revolution in American history occurred with the Civil War in which the Northern
model of economic, social, and political organization triumphed and led to a
profound set of transformations akin to the Puritan and Glorious Revolutions in
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fundamental social, economic, and political differences were resolved
through tremendous bloodshed and loss of life. The two countries
share similar historical struggles for citizenship rights where various
subordinate and marginalized groups sought to acquire equal legal
standing vis-a-vis the state, including the bourgeoisie, workers,
women, and minorities. 2 While the expansion of social rights has
been arguably more extensive in the United Kingdom than in the
United States, the protection of civil and political rights in both
countries has remained a bedrock institution. In the international
sphere, two countries that were once enemies in the eighteenth century
became staunch allies that have shared a remarkably close relationship
ever since. This so-called "special" relationship has included the
enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in the 1820s and 1830s, the
experience of confronting tyranny in two World Wars, a Cold War,
and two Gulf Wars, as well as numerous other conflicts. Such
collaboration and mutual support also led to the United States and
United Kingdom being the leaders in the construction of the system of
international law across a variety of policy areas, most notably that of
international human rights.
More recently, however, both countries have fallen victim to
violent terrorist attacks perpetrated by operatives from the loose
global terrorist network known as al-Qaeda. Less than four years after
the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on the
morning of September 11, 2001, London experienced a series of
England. See

BARRINGTON MOORE, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 152-53
(1966); DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND

DEMOCRACY 122-26 (1992).

2. T.H.

MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS

70-83 (discussing the impact increased interest in citizenship has had on social class
standing)

(1976); J.M.

BARBALET, CITIZENSHIP: RIGHTS, STRUGGLE, AND CLASS

INEQUALITY 31-43 (1988);

see also JOE FOWERAKER

& TODD LANDMAN,

CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A COMPARATIVE AND STATISTICAL

ANALYSIS 26-35 (1997).
3. PHILLIPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND
BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR's ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE W.
BUSH'S ILLEGAL WAR 8-9 (2005); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 91
(2001); MICHELINE ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES

TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 120-21, 329-35 (2004).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/9
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successful terrorist attacks on July 7, 2005, followed by a series of
unsuccessful attacks on July 21, 2005. 4 These attacks from Islamist
extremists have led to a response from both countries that has curbed
the kinds of civil liberties and eroded long-cherished legal guarantees
that have served as the beacon for free people the world over. The5
United Kingdom expanded already-permanent anti-terror legislation
and the United States passed the U.S.A. Patriot Act 6 and other related
statutes that, taken together, have extended unprecedented power and
discretion in the executive branches of government across broad
dimensions of citizen and non-citizen life in both countries. Such
discretion has meant that over the last five years the domestic
protection of individual liberties has become more precarious as the
writ of executive authority has expanded in ways that could never
have been imagined before the attacks of September 11. Indeed, as A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A More Secure
World) notes, the newly declared "'war on terrorism' [now in its sixth
very values that terrorists
year] has in some instances corroded the
7
target: human rights and the rule of law."
As part of the 2006-2007 speaker series sponsored by California
Western School of Law and University of California San Diego's
Institute for International, Comparative, and Area Studies, this article
uses A More Secure World as a backdrop for examining the U.S. and
U.K. domestic responses to terrorism from a human rights perspective.
4. Todd Landman, The United Kingdom: The Continuity of Terror and
Counterterror, in NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN

RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES

DEBATE TERRORISM 84-85 (Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 2007).

5. The U.K. Terrorism Act of 2000, which preceded the September 11, 2001
attacks in the United States, made permanent all previous anti-terrorist legislation,
developed most notably to combat terrorism related to the troubles in Northern
Ireland. See Landman, supra note 4, at 81; ANDREW BLICK ET AL., THE RULES OF
THE GAME: TERRORISM, COMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 31 (2006).

6. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (U.S.A. Patriot Act), Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
7. The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challengesand Change, 147, delivered
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A More
Secure World], availableat http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.
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A More Secure World identifies six clusters of threats facing all states
in the world, including conflict between states; violence within states;
poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation; weapons
of mass destruction; terrorism; and transnational organized crime.
This article addresses the terrorist threat and structures its argument
around the two ideas of imminence and proportionalityto examine the
ways in which the United States and United Kingdom have judged the
scale of the terrorist threat and the degree to which their responses
have been proportional to that threat. This article argues that while
both countries do face a terrorist threat, one that is arguably more
imminent in the United Kingdom than in the United States, the scale
of the response has been disproportionately extreme in both
countries. 8 This has led to a slow but noticeable reclaiming of
authority from the U.S. Congress and Supreme Court, the U.K. House
of Commons and judiciary, and in some degree, mass publics in both
countries. This article argues further that adopting a human rightsbased approach to fighting terrorism is not a "soft" option that leaves
either country more open to attack. Rather, such an approach upholds
hard-won and long-cherished values, fortifies the rule of law, curbs
the unintended consequence of encouraging further terrorism, and
serves as an example for other countries to follow in what appears to
be a long-term struggle against violent extremism.
To advance this argument, this article is divided into four sections.
The first section examines the ways in which imminence and
proportionality feature in A More Secure World and other
international and regional human rights standards to frame the main
contours of the analysis presented here. It will be shown that
international and regional human rights standards already have in
place a series of provisions that stipulate when and under what
conditions states can derogate from their legal obligations to protect
8. Two types of evidence support this claim. First, in the context of the United
Kingdom, the December 2004 eight to one Law Lords ruling in A. v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken

from Eng.), found particular aspects of the United Kingdom's response to terrorism
disproportionate to the threat that has been posed. Louis Blom-Cooper, Government
and Judiciary,in THE BLAIR EFFECT 2001-5, at 234-35 (Anthony Seldon & Dennis

Kavanaugh eds., 2005). Second, in the United States, there has not been such a
ruling, although an analysis across many dimensions of the U.S. response
demonstrates a very large net cost to the American people in financial, legal, and
rhetorical terms. IAN S. LUSTICK, TRAPPED IN THE WAR ON TERROR 70-114 (2006).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/9
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human rights. The second section examines the dilemma of liberal
democracies, which face the twin challenges of suffering more
terrorist attacks than non-democracies and upholding liberal
democratic values that are deeply embedded in their history and
political culture. This section challenges the implicit assumption and
logic that liberal democracies face necessary trade-offs between the
risk of terrorist attacks and the protection of civil liberties, and
examines the importance of mechanisms for ensuring vertical and
horizontal accountability. Ironically, such mechanisms are formally
weaker in the United Kingdom than in the United States, although the
U.K. government has been under more significant constraint and
judicial oversight thus far than the U.S. government. The third section
presents a brief comparison of the main contours of the domestic
legislative response to terrorist threats and reflects on the fact that the
United Kingdom has had a long history and much experience in
tackling terrorism in the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland. In
the fourth and final section, the article concludes with a summary of
the main components of the argument presented, as well as an outline
of how a human rights-based approach to combating terrorism at the
domestic level is the preferred strategy in the long run if we are to
heed Jefferson's warning and not sacrifice both our liberty and our
security.
II.

IMMINENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY

The concepts of imminence and proportionality are fundamentally
important in any assessment of a state's response to terrorism, and
each concept has been the subject of much academic, policy, and legal
debate. The attacks of September 11 raised the issue of imminence to
a high level of salience in two important ways. First, while terrorist
threats had been monitored in the years before the attacks, when they9
actually occurred, the sense of imminence became more palatable.
9. There are numerous accounts about the monitoring of possible terrorist
attacks on the United States, especially after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center, as well as the varying degree of importance the issue received by different
presidential administrations. See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES:
INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 238-46 (2004); LUSTICK, supra note 8, at 3031; NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE U.S.,

NAT'L POLICY

COORDINATION: STAFF STATEMENT 8 (Mar. 24, 2004).
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The psychological fear and unpredictability surrounding the "next
attack" increased dramatically,' ° even though the probability of
another large and well-coordinated attack decreased significantly."
Second, since the attacks came from a highly decentralized network of
terrorists who had been operating within the United States, there was
no way of knowing in the short to medium term if and when another
attack would occur. These two factors had a similar impact on
decision-makers in the United Kingdom after the July 2005 bombings.
In a sense, the need to be seen to be doing something about terrorism
has had its own political logic in leading to a proliferation of new
legislation giving government more authority to combat terrorism. In
the United States, the passage of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, the most
significant piece of anti-terror legislation, was "a symbolic shake of
the collective fist against the lurking terrorist menace."' 2 In the
United Kingdom, former Prime Minister Tony Blair issued a twelvepoint plan in August 2005 to combat terror using a variety of
legislative and administrative means that consolidated and expanded
3
existing powers to combat terrorism.'

10. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NExT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERROR 1-9 (2006).
11. Paul Pillar, Perceptionsof Terrorism: Continuity and Change, in LAW VS.
WAR: COMPETING APPROACHES TO FIGHTING TERRORISM 3, 4 (2005), availableat

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub613.pdf.
In addition, a
comparative study of terrorist attacks in Iraq, Colombia, and Afghanistan has shown
that the probability of terrorist attacks that kill large numbers of people is
remarkably low owing to the challenges of coordination. See Neil F. Johnson et al.,
Universal

Patterns

Underlying

Ongoing

Wars

and

Terrorism,

http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/PaperLANL6.pdf; Neil F. Johnson et al., From
Old Wars to New Wars and Global Terrorism, http://xxx.lanl.gov/ftp/physics

/papers/0605/0605035.pdf.
12. ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 2.
13. See Landman, supra note 4, at 85-86. The twelve-point plan included new
grounds for deportation and exclusion; new anti-terrorism legislation; refusal of
asylum for anyone having had anything to do with terrorism; enhanced powers to
strip British citizenship from dual citizens and naturalized citizens; time limits on all
extradition cases; significant extension of pre-trial detention; extension of control
orders against those who cannot be deported; enhancement of court capacity to hear
deportation and control order cases; proscription of extremist organizations; rise in
the threshold for British citizenship; power to close places of worship that espouse
extremist views; and speeding up of border control plans to include biometric data.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/9
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But what about the imminence of the terrorist threat? Beyond the
reaction and the rhetoric, what has been the outcome of a more sober
assessment of the threat in real terms? Is the threat more imminent in
the United Kingdom than in the United States? The most far-reaching
assessment of the existence of the threat in the United States to date
can be found in Ian Lustick's Trapped in the War on Terror.14 He
begins his analysis by pointing out the irony that the increase in
government authority and freedom to pursue suspects relatively
unhindered by judicial review or oversight has meant that there has
been ample opportunity to collect intelligence and data on the post9/11 terrorist threat.' 5 He notes that over thirty thousand "national
security letters"' 6 have been issued per annum in an effort to uncover
terror networks, sleeper cells, and other terrorist activities; data bases
have been mined; phone calls have been tapped; five thousand persons
of interest whose visas have expired have been detained; and eightythree thousand suspects have been confined and interrogated outside
the United States with over twenty percent remaining in custody as of
late 2005.17 And he notes that at no time since 9/11 has the threat
condition declared by the Department for Homeland Security been
lower than "elevated," which indicates a "significant risk of terror
attacks."' 18 The result since 9/11 has been thirty-nine convictions for
terrorism and national security-related crimes and a handful of further
convictions. 19 Moreover, only one of the foreign nationals detained

14.

See generally LUSTICK, supra note 8.

15. Id.at 31.
16. These letters are issued to federal agents without judicial or legislative
oversight and allow their bearer to collect information on numerous activities of
private citizens, such as financial transactions, cohabitation arrangements, travel
movements, telephone calls, emails, and Internet usage. See id. at 33. The use of
such letters was heavily criticized in a report published by the Inspector General of
the Department of Justice on March 9, 2007. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III
conceded that in many instances, their use was improper. The Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) traced the increase in the use of the letters after September
11, 2001. "There were 8500 in 2000, 39,000 in 2003, 56,000 in 2004, and 47,000 in
2005, the years covered in . . . [the] review." David Stout, F.B.L Head Admits
Mistakes in Use of the Security Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2007, at Al.
17. LUSTICK, supra note 8, at 35.

18. Id. at 8-9.
19. Id. at 37.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
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since 9/11 has been convicted of a terrorist crime. 20 This assessment
reveals not a complete absence of terrorist activity, but it does raise
significant questions concerning the imminence of the threat for
Americans, and it raises the larger question of the proportionality of
the response.
The threat of terror in the United Kingdom is arguably greater
than that facing the United States. Unlike the United States, Britain
has lived with the spectre of terrorism throughout the conflict in
Northern Ireland, which led to 3297 deaths, over 10,000 injuries,
35,798 shootings, 15,351 bombs, 21,049 armed robberies, as well as
the discovery of 11,605 firearms and 115,517 kilograms of
explosives. 2 1 These totals do not include the terrorist campaign on
mainland Britain, which included multiple assassinations and
bombings throughout the period, the last of which were the 1996
bombings in Canary Wharf and Manchester City Centre. The
violence was most pronounced in the early years of the conflict,
especially during the years surrounding Bloody Sunday in 1972 and
the Guildford and Birmingham bombings in 1974. It then declined
dramatically during the period of direct rule between 1974 and 1998,
which ended with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.2 2 Britain has
also been the victim of international terrorism relating to Palestine,
Kenya, Malaysia, Cyprus, Aden, and Libya, 23 and there have been a
series of terrorist events involving car bombs and shootings in
London, as well as the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 en route
from Frankfurt to New York over Lockerbie in Scotland where 259
passengers and eleven people on the ground were killed.24

20. Id.
21. Terence Taylor, United Kingdom, in COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES
OFTEN COUNTRIES 187, 201-03 (Yonah Alexander ed., 2002).
22. Landman, supra note 4, at 78-79.
23. Taylor, supra note 21, at 210-11; Clive Walker, Policy Options and
Priorities: British Perspectives, in CONFRONTING TERRORISM: EUROPEAN
EXPERIENCES, THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES 11, 11-12 (Marianne van
Leeuwen ed., 2003); Tom Parker, Appendix A: Counterterrorism Policies in the
United Kingdom, in PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR 119, 119-48 (Philip
B. Heymann & Juliette N. Kayyem eds., 2005).

24.

CHRIS COOK & JOHN STEVENSON, THE LONGMAN COMPANION TO BRITAIN

SINCE 1945, at 203 (1996).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/9
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Beyond these many different incidents related to Northern Ireland
and elsewhere, the post-9/J I patterns in terrorist activity in the United
Kingdom have a different character to those before 9/11 and represent
a graver threat compared to the evidence of activity collected in the
United States. The perpetrators of the July 7 bombings were Britishborn, second-generation young Muslims who had grown up under
conditions of relative material comfort.
Their parents owned
businesses, and many of the bombers had qualified for higher
education degrees. While their radicalization may well have come
from external sources, these are British citizens on whom the British
political system and culture has failed to make the kind of impression
that would prevent their radicalization.2 5 There have been subsequent
attempts to carry out terrorist attacks on July 21, 2005 in London,
again in late the summer of 2006 on transatlantic flights, and again in
early 2007 in Birmingham, where security forces disrupted an alleged
attempt to kidnap and decapitate a British Muslim soldier. Dame
Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5 (the United
Kingdom's national security service), declared in November 2006 that
British intelligence had been watching sixteen hundred people in two
hundred cells believed to be plotting terrorist attacks in Britain or
26
overseas.
Having considered these different portraits on the imminence of
the terrorist threat facing the United Kingdom and the United States,
what does the principle of proportionality entail and why is it
important to consider here? There are many sources for the principle
of proportionality. At the international level, it comes from just war
theory and the international legal principles of jus ad bello and jus in
bello, governed most notably by the Geneva Conventions and their
additional Protocols. These principles make reference to the ways in
which sovereign states ought to respond to attacks or the threat of
attacks from other states, the ways in which states may intervene in an
armed conflict on humanitarian grounds, as well as the ways in which
they ought to conduct any armed action.2 7 A More Secure World is
25.

See BLICK ET AL., supra note 5, at 27.

26. Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, Address at Queen Mary College:
International Terrorist Threat to the U.K. (Nov. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/textonly/Page374.html.

27. For the general arguments around just war and proportionality in
international interventions, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
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explicit that proportionality must be one of the five criteria used for
governing states: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort,
proportional means, and balance of consequences. 28 Beyond the
principle's application to inter-state interactions, it is also a
fundamental principle underlying the activities of the European Union
that draws on a longer German legal tradition. 29 At this level, the
notion of proportionality states that any layer of government should
not take any action that exceeds that which is necessary to achieve the
objective of government. At the municipal legal level (i.e., domestic
legal frameworks), proportionality refers to the system of punishment
for crimes committed by persons found guilty in the judicial process.
For example, there is considerable jurisprudence from the U.S.
Supreme Court on the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution on what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
and how punishment fits the crime.3°
Despite its provenance in international, regional, and domestic
legal standards, the term proportionality varies in definition and
interpretation.
While it has been traditionally associated with
mathematics, it has clearly become a useful principle in politics and
law. In an article referring to the Israeli war with Lebanon in the
summer of 2006, William Safire defined proportionality as:
[T]he Latin pro portione, "according to each part" - can mean
"balance, symmetry, corresponding in magnitude or intensity." But
"corresponding" is not the same as "equivalent"; rather, the noun
and adjective proportional deals with the relationship among parts.

MORAL ARGUMENT WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 86-108 (1977); for an application of just

war theory in the age of terror, which justifies the invasion of Afghanistan as well as
Iraq, see JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR: THE BURDEN OF
AMERICAN POWER IN A VIOLENT WORLD 59-70 (2004).
28. A More Secure World, supra note 7, 207.
29. See generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW (3d ed. 2003)

(discussing the history of the European Union and the legal disputes which have
arisen out of its existence).
30. See generally Shawn E. Fields, Note, Constitutional Comparativism and
the Eighth Amendment: How a Flawed ProportionalityRequirement Can Benefit

from Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 963 (2006) (surveying U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in which the Court contemplated the proper role of comparative law in
Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis).
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/9
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As used in today's headlines and polemics, it carries a special sense
31

of "not excessive."

Others see the term as implying balance or evenness between that
which has been done and that which must be done in response. For
the purposes of this article, it is important to relate the notion of
proportionality to that of the social contract. Within a sovereign state,
citizens agree to give the state powers over them but only to the extent
that is necessary to create order and harmony. Otherwise, the
excessive response from the state to external and internal threats
undermines the social contract, compromises the legitimacy of the
state, and may well encourage citizens to mobilize violently against
the state. International human rights and humanitarian laws have
sought to extend this logic of the social contract to all humans, not just
citizens within a particular state (a point that becomes crucial in the
overall argument presented here).
There is an intimate and fundamental relationship between the
imminence of the terrorist threat and the proportionality of the
response. Any assessment of that relationship should then be used to
formulate a longer-term strategy for states to pursue in their response
to terrorism. This article offers such an assessment in the case of the
United States and the United Kingdom and examines the degree to
which judgments about proportionality have been reached and the
degree to which the Bush and Blair governments have indeed
exceeded that which is necessary to achieve their objectives. But
before examining the nature of the response in both countries, it is
first necessary to consider how that response and its proportionality
are located in larger questions of liberal democracy and its different
mechanisms for horizontal and vertical accountability.
III. THE DILEMMAS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Liberal democracies in the world today face a double challenge
from global terrorism: 1) they suffer significantly more terrorism than
non-democratic countries, and 2) there is a natural tension between the
values of liberal democracy and the need for greater security. Crossnational time-series analysis of terrorist "events" has shown that

31. William Safire, Proportionality,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, § 6, at 20.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
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liberal democracies, especially "old" democracies, 32 suffer a
disproportionate number of terrorist attacks. 33 A recent test of the
Huntington thesis about the "clash of civilizations" 34 shows that the
Islam-West civilizational "dyad" has significantly more terrorist
incidents and has suffered more killings as a result of terrorist
activities than other civilizational pairs in the world.35 The dominant
interpretation of these statistical findings is that liberal democracies by
their very nature are more open and thus suffer more attacks. 36 Such
an interpretation may well lead to the conclusion that liberal
democracies should not be so open. Rather, they should curb liberties
in an effort to stop the attacks. But some additional qualifications to
the statistical findings are necessary. For the civilizational analysis
and the analysis of suicide attacks, the data sets used counted attacks
on U.S. facilities in foreign countries as attacks on the United States.37
This coding rule necessarily leads to an over-counting of attacks
against the United States as a nation, and by extension may well skew
the results for the Islam-West dyad. The pattern of attacks may well
be due to weak state capacity and lower resource levels for security in
countries that host U.S. facilities, and counting these attacks as
equivalent to attacks on the continental United States misrepresents
them. For the greater propensity of democracies to suffer terrorist
32. Old democracies are those countries that have established and maintained
democracy before the advent of the "third wave" of democratization with the
Portuguese democratic transition in 1974. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,
THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991)
(discussing the global transitions to democracy between 1974 and 1990).
33. Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 343, 349-50 (2003); WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF TERRORISM 25-27 (2006); MONTY G. MARSHALL & TED R. GURR,
PEACE AND CONFLICT 70 (2006); Quan Li, Does Democracy Promote Transnational

Terrorism?,49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 278, 281 (2005).
34. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 125-39 (1996).
35. Eric Neumayer & Thomas Pluemper, International Terrorism and the
Clash of Civilizations: Was Huntington Right After All? (Working Paper),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=952208.
36. ENDERS & SANDLER, supra note 33, at 25-27.
37. Ed F. Mickolus et al., International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist
Events,
1968-2002,
ITERATE
Project
(2003),
http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/
ssdc/ite00001 .html.
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attacks, one analysis that controls for different components of
democracy shows a negative relationship between high levels of
participation and high levels of terrorism on the one hand, and a
positive relationship between greater constraints on governments and
higher levels of terrorism. 38 In other words, those countries in which
there are greater controls over the arbitrary exercise of government
power and authority tend to experience more terrorist attacks. Once
again, one outcome of this result would be to loosen such controls on
the authority of government.
These data and interpretations on the propensity for liberal
democracies to be victims of terrorist attacks have led to a natural
response from academics and policy makers to posit that there is a
necessary trade-off between the risk of future terrorist attacks and
further terrorist damage on the one hand, and the curbing of civil
liberties on the other hand. 39 For example, Campbell and Connolly
note that "[d]ominant legal discourses on the 'war on terror' proceed
from an assumption that a revised legal regime, loosening restrictions
on security agencies, will yield consequential anti-terrorist benefits. 4 °
In political science and political theory, there is an emerging
consensus that some adjustment on our individual freedom is justified,
where commentators vary on their relative degree of reluctance to
accept this view and as to what ought to be the appropriate balance
between liberty and security.41 A starker illustration of this trade-off
is presented by Enders and Sandler, who provide a formal model of
38. Li, supra note 33, at 281, 294.
39. Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism and Democracy, in 4 TERRORISM AND
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 14 (1992); Joe Eyerman, Terrorism and Democratic States:
Soft Targets or Accessible Systems, 24 INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 151-70

(1998).
40. Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, Making War on Terror? Global Lessons
from Northern Ireland, 69 MODERN L. REV. 935, 935 (2006). See also Michael
German, Squaring the Error, in LAW VS. WAR: COMPETING APPROACHES TO
FIGHTING TERRORISM 11, 13-14 (2005).
41. ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 2; MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL:
POLITICAL ETHICS IN THE AGE OF TERROR

54-63 (2005); Bruce Ackerman, The

Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1045-53 (2004); David Cole, The
Priorityof Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blindspot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753,
1785-99 (2004); Fernando R. Tes6n, Liberal Security, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
'WAR ON TERROR' 57 (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005); Jeremy Waldron,
Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 191-210 (2003).
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the trade-off between "expected terrorism damage" and civil
liberties.42 The model posits a societal constraint curve that intersects
with a series of indifference curves, where at different moments,
different equilibria between expected terrorist damage and civil
liberties are obtained. Figure 1 is a reproduction of their model.
Expected
terrorism
damage

De
A

0

Ce

Civil liberties

Figure 1. The terror damage-civil liberty trade-off 43

The figure shows that expected terrorism damage is on the vertical
axis and civil liberties protection is on the horizontal axis. The
constraint curve AB represents the relationship between terrorism and
civil liberties, where the cost of increasing civil liberties is a greater
exposure to terrorism. For this model, the most benefit accrues from
the reduction of civil liberties along the upward sloping end of the
curve, where there is a decreasing benefit from significant reduction in
civil liberties. In other words, for this part of the model, "[e]ach
additional sacrifice of freedom gains less additional security from
terrorist attacks. 44 This constraint curve is combined with a series of
indifference curves (x), which are meant to indicate how willing
society is to trade civil liberties for terrorism risks. At the intersection
of the indifference curves and the constraint curve AB we find
equilibrium point E, the point at which society experiences an optimal
45
ratio of civil liberty protection (C,), and terrorist damage (D).
42.
43.
44.
45.

See ENDERS & SANDLER, supra note 33, at 34.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.
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But is this trade-off depicted in Figure 1 necessarily correct?
There are two significant qualifications that need to be made to the
logic presented in the model. First, research on the conflict in
Northern Ireland has shown that increased repression from the British
Government, particularly during the period of home rule between
1974 and 1998, led to a proliferation of terrorist activity and
recruitment of new members in the IRA.46 Qualitative analysis of
released prisoners reveals the cumulative effect of the British Aimy
presence and tactics, such as house raids and the exercise of stop and
search powers, in Northern Ireland oftentimes provided a series of
"tipping factors" that propelled terrorists into activism. 47
The
experience in Northern Ireland suggests that at some point, the
increased restriction on civil liberties may actually lead to an increase
in terrorist activities and, by extension, terrorist damage; an argument
that has been made for other contexts in which governments adopt a
harsh response to terrorism.4 8
The recent police interrogation of terror suspect Abu Bakr in the
Birmingham kidnapping plot led to his public accusation that Muslims
were living in a "police state., 49 The veracity of the claim is not as
important as the view that it represents. There is a growing fear in the
Muslim community that they are disproportionately affected by the
anti-terror response; this response is linked to the radicalization of
Muslim youth in Britain; and the response inhibits Muslim community
cooperation in identifying suspects. 50 This suggests that perhaps the
constraint curve in the model should be upward-sloping at the low end
of civil liberty protection, which captures the idea that, at some point,
the perceived restriction on civil liberties has the counter-productive
impact of increasing terrorist violence.

46. Landman, supra note 4, at 78-79, 90.
47. Campbell & Connolly, supra note 40, at 945-51; Parker, supra note 23, at
125-28.
48. Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 COMP. POL. 379, 384-85
(1981); Peter Rosendorff & Todd Sandier, Too Much of a Good Thing? The
Proactive Response Dilemma, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 657 (2004) (discussing the
negative impact overreaction to terrorism can have on controlling terrorism).
49. Ex-Terror Plot Suspect Speaks Out, BBC NEWS, Feb. 8, 2007,
http://news.bbb.co.uk/l/hi/uk/6340935.stm.
50. See BLICK ET AL., supra note 5, at 18, 23-24, 29.
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A second qualification to the model is that there is also a lower
limit as to how much a country may legally curb civil liberties. The
international law of human rights is clear about derogable and nonderogable rights. For example, Article 4 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)-of which the United States
and United Kingdom are states parties-stipulates that in times of a
"public emergency that threatens the life of the nation," certain rights
protections cannot be eliminated, including the right to life (Article 6),
freedom from slavery and servitude (Article 8), imprisonment for
failure to uphold a contractual obligation (Article 11), protection
against ex post facto legislation (Article 15), the right to legal
personality and recognition (Article 16), and the right not to be
subjected to arbitrary interference in privacy, home, and
correspondence. 51 For the United Kingdom, Article 15 of the
European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that during times of
war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation, a country
may not derogate from similar rights protections as those found in the
ICCPR.52 These examples suggest that there is indeed a lower
boundary of curbing liberties below which countries may not go in
their efforts to fight terrorism, even if such terrorist activities threaten
the life of the nation.
Taken together, the possibility that curbing liberties may well
encourage greater terrorism and the notion of the lower boundary
suggest that the model depicted in Figure 1 should be modified to
some degree. Figure 2 shows this modified version, where the
constraint curve AB has a rising lower tail to capture the idea of an
increase in terrorism damage in response to a significant curbing of
civil liberties, and a vertical boundary of rights protection (Cf) that
may not be crossed under any circumstances.

51. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 [hereinafter ICCPR].
52. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter ECHR]; ICCPR, supra note 51. There are similar provisions in the
American Convention on Human Rights. See Org. of Am. States, American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123.
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Figure 2. Constrained terrorist damage-civil liberty trade-off

The response to terrorism in the United Kingdom and United
States has been to curb liberties in ways that attempt to cross the lower
boundary, even though this may encourage more terrorism. The
United Kingdom crossed the boundary in its response to terrorism
associated with the conflict in Northern Ireland, one significant aspect
of which (the treatment of prisoners in interrogation) was ultimately
adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in its
1978 judgment on Ireland v. United Kingdom.5 3 The United Kingdom
crossed the boundary again with its legislation passed after the July
2005 bombings.
Again, two significant aspects (the indefinite
detention of foreign terror suspects and the use of control orders) have
54
been adjudicated under the auspices of the 1998 Human Rights Act,
which brings further effect to the ECHR within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.
The U.S. government also crossed the lower boundary, in part by
re-writing the law and in part by disregarding it altogether. The war
metaphor has led the United States to respond in ways that have
53. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1976).
54. Human
Rights
Act
of
1998
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/actsl998/19980042.htm [hereinafter Human Rights
Act).
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missed the opportunity for the application of criminal law and the
methodology of "proactive criminal investigation., 55 In an abstract
sense, it is easier for non-democracies to fight terrorism on the
domestic front because they are less accountable to their citizens and
can introduce a range of measures that curb any rights protections that
may have existed or that citizens may have been able to exercise in the
absence of formal legal protection. In contrast, it is much harder for
democracies to fight terrorism because they are accountable to their
citizens; and, in liberal democracies, rights are enshrined in national
constitutions or find expression through other legal mechanisms. The
combination of majority decision-making and minority rights
protections is a firm principle in liberal democratic theory, and was a
key set of compromises reached in the founding of America as
Madison sought to prevent the tyranny of the majority.56 The practical
solution has been to construct models of democratic government that
have a variety of mechanisms for both vertical and horizontal
accountability.
Democracies achieve vertical accountability formally through
periodic elections and the alternation of control over government
through some form of representative political party system. They
achieve this less formally through providing a set of rights and
freedoms that allows to flourish a "free and lively civil society"; this
society both contributes to setting the issue and policy agenda and
holds government to account through its ability to mobilise mass
publics in times of severe crisis and critique. Mechanisms for
horizontal accountability, on the other hand, include those institutional
checks and balances among different branches of government as well
as among civilians, military personnel, and the security services. The
principle of judicial review and legislative oversight of executive
powers is meant to constrain leaders and prevent the worst forms of
abuse of power.
Both the United States and United Kingdom have a long history
of fortifying the mechanisms for vertical accountability, including the
extension of suffrage and the protection of the rights to assembly,
association, speech, thought, and religious faith; however, the
mechanisms for horizontal accountability vary considerably between
55. German, supra note 40, at 14.
56. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
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the two countries. The historic decision in Marbury v. Madison
established the principle of judicial review, while the U.S.
Constitution formally outlined the powers of the all three branches,
established the separation of powers, and left any residual powers to
the individual States. In contrast, the United Kingdom does not have a
written constitution that explicitly delineates the powers of the
different governmental institutions; the power and authority of
government and the liberal constraints on it have evolved in piecemeal
Power has shifted
fashion since the seventeenth century. 5 8
increasingly from the Crown to Parliament and has given rise to the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, where the House of Commons
59
has become the primary chamber following the 1911 Parliament Act,
and the executive (i.e. the Government) has dominated the Commons,
effectively leaving less room for horizontal accountability. 60 But,
Britain has been a key architect in the development of the European
Human Rights "regime" 6 1 as one of the authors of the 1950 European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Individual
Freedoms, 62 whose articles were finally brought into the domestic
63
legal system through the enactment of the 1998 Human Rights Act.
Participation in the European regime has meant that Britain is
subjected to the judgments of the ECHR and is open to scrutiny by

57.
58.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Landman, supra note 4, at 76-77.

59. Id.
60. On March 7, 2007, the House of Commons made an historic decision to
remove the last ninety-two hereditary peers in the House of Lords to call for new
legislation that would create a fully elected second chamber, thereby ending the 700
years of unelected rule. One week later, the House of Lords responded by voting for
an all-appointed house. Will Woodward, Historic Vote for All-Elected House of
Lords, GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/
lords/story/0,,2028928,00.html; Lords Reform in 'Next Manifesto,' BBC News, July
19, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk-politics/6906518.stm.
61. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, in 40
INT'L ORG. 620-24 (1986). See generally JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 138-41 (2d ed. 2003).

62. ECHR, supra note 52. See also Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in PostwarEurope, in 54 INT'L ORG. 217
(2000); SIMPSON, supra note 3, at 713.
63. Human Rights Act, supra note 54.
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other institutions within the Council of Europe (e.g., the Human
Rights Commissioner).
The mechanisms for horizontal accountability are different in the
United States. The separation of powers as laid out formally in the
U.S. Constitution, coupled with the principle of judicial review in
theory, suggests that the mechanisms for horizontal accountability
should provide the kind of oversight that would curb excessive
usurpation of executive authority. The power of the three branches
has indeed vacillated throughout American history. In fact, the
twentieth century has witnessed various periods in which one or
another branch of government has exerted greater power, such as the
rise of the "imperial" presidency in the 1960s, 64 the perennial post-war
"problem" of divided government, 65 and the waxing and waning of
"judicial activism, '' 66 most notably in cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954 and Roe v. Wade in 1973.67 Under the exigencies
of the immediate post-9/11 period, however, the general mood in the
political establishment was that enhancing executive branch power
was necessary to provide greater security. Since the attacks, the
President has amassed significant new powers exercised through
federal agencies to collect and analyze private information that has
been obtained secretly (e.g., telephone, internet, library, medical,

64. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 177-

207 (1973)

(discussing the events in the 1960s and 1970s that led to the

development of an "imperial presidency"); ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE 57-

100 (2006) (discussing the major developments in executive power during the 1960s
and 1970s).
65.

DAVID MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAW MAKING

AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990, at 1-7 (1991); Morris P. Fiorina, The Causes and
Consequences of Divided Government: Lessons of 1992-1994, in DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT; CHANGE, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

35, 35-

59 (Peter F. Galderisi, ed., 2d ed. 1996); see also David McKay, Divided and
Governed? Recent Research on Divided Government in the United States, 24 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 517, 517-18 (1994).

66. Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origins and Current Meanings of "Judicial
See also CHRISTOPHER WOLFE,
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY? 2-31 (2d
ed. 1997).
67. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (2004).
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educational, and financial records), 68 while the White House has
sidestepped usual mechanisms of horizontal accountability 69 inorder
to be able to prosecute the war on terror.
IV. THE U.S. AND THE U.K. RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
The attacks of September 11 and the July attacks in London four
years later have produced a robust legislative response from the U.S.
and U.K. governments that has tested significantly the boundaries of
law and challenged the values associated with democracy and human
rights. Previous sections of this article have made some references to
this response, but this section provides a fuller examination of the
post-9/11 response. Britain already had a considerable record of antiterror legislation on its statute books, most of which had been directed
toward the problems in Ireland and, since 1921, Northern Ireland.7 °
Indeed, between 1761 and 1972, there were twenty-six legislative acts
with provisions for combating Irish nationalism, including special
courts, detention without trial, and the suspension of habeas corpus. 7 1
"Since the 1970s, [thirteen pieces of significant legislation] have been
introduced to combat domestic and international terrorism, including
laws concerning hostage-taking, transport and use of nuclear
materials, aviation and maritime security, and terrorist acts committed
in Northern Ireland and on mainland Britain as part of the struggle for
".
These various provisions for combating
Irish nationalism .. ."7'
terrorism were always temporary and required new parliamentary
approval to be amended and extended.
However, the Terrorism Act of 2000 made permanent these past
efforts, and since September 11, 2001, the Labour government has
68. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL:
LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 17 (2003),

available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/Assessing
theNewNormal.pdf.
69. Julie A. Mertus, Human Rights and Civil Society in a New Age of American
Exceptionalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 'WAR ON TERROR' 318-19 (Richard
Ashby Wilson ed., 2005).
70. Landman, supra note 4, at 78-81.
71. Richard Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the 'War on Terror,' in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE 'WAR ON TERROR' 32 (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005). See also
CONOR GEARTY, CAN HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? 99-101 (2006).
72. See Landman, supra note 4, at 80.
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introduced six new significant pieces of anti-terror legislation (see
Table 1). These various acts expanded the powers of the Home
Office, the police, and Security Services across a wide range of issues
relating to the establishment and maintenance of terrorist
organizations, the incitement of terrorist acts on British soil, the
involvement in international terrorism, and, more generally, the
support of terrorist organizations and acts, as well as the glorification
of terrorism itself. These powers, coupled with a formal derogation
from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights,73
allowed the Home Office to detain indefinitely without charge
fourteen foreign terror suspects, a decision that was later overruled by
the Law Lords in December 2004 for being disproportionate and
discriminatory.74 The government responded with new provisions in
the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 that allowed the Home
Secretary to use "control orders" that limit the freedom of movement
and communication of the original detainees as well as any new
suspects deemed appropriate. As in the indefinite detention of foreign
suspects, these control orders also have been found to be incompatible
with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.75

73.
74.
[2005] 2
75.

ECHR, supra note 52, art. 5.
A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56,
A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.).
ECHR, supra note 52, art. 5.
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76
Table 1. Counterterror Legislation in the United Kingdom

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Tokyo Convention Act 1967
Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978
International Protected Persons Act 1978
Taking of Hostages Act 1982
Aviation Security Act 1982
Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989
Aviation of Maritime Security Act 1990

10. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy Act) 1998
Terrorism Act 2000
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003
Civil Contingencies Act 2004
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
Terrorism Act 2006
Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act 2006

The British anti-terror legislation also allows the government to
detain without charge any terror suspect for a period of up to twentyeight days, the debate over which cost the Government its first
Commons defeat since taking power in 1997. In addition to these
events and those surrounding the investigations into the bombings on
July 7, 2005, the further attempted bombings in the same month and in
August 2006, and the Birmingham beheading plot in January 2007,
these powers have been used to stop and search large numbers of
people living in Britain. Between April 1, 2001 and March 31, 2005,
the police and security services stopped and searched 111,900 under
the Terrorism Act of 2000, of whom approximately 1.4% were
subsequently arrested.77 During the previous four years since Labour

76. See Landman, supra note 4, at 81.
77. HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN,

ARRESTS FOR RECORDED CRIME
(NOTIFIABLE OFFENCES) AND THE OPERATION OF CERTAIN POLICE POWERS UNDER

PACE 12 (2005),
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/
hosb2lO5.pdf [hereinafter HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN]; Campbell &

Connolly, supra note 40, at 957.
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came to power, 27,000 people were stopped and searched, with a
subsequent arrest rate of 1.5%.78
These figures suggest the possibility of indiscriminate use of antiterrorist powers by British police and security services even though
the arrest rate has remained roughly the same.79
The response in the United States has been markedly different.
The existing National Security Act of 1947 was deemed appropriate to
give the National Security Council the power to consider issues of
domestic security arising as external threats, but since the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, successive administrations have
sought to consolidate and coordinate the responsibility for combating
terrorism. President Clinton passed Presidential Decision Directive 39
in June 1995 with the aim to reduce vulnerabilities, deter terrorism,
respond to terrorism, and prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction."
Presidential Directive 62 followed in 1998 to
strengthen the ability of one agency to take the lead in combating
terrorism. 81 The attention of the U.S. government throughout the
Clinton Administration had been on the Bin Laden network, which
saw the East African embassy bombings as watershed events, as well
as the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. But, as has
been reported widely, during the first nine months of the Bush
Administration, the White House reduced the seniority of principal
actors involved in combating terrorism, most notably Richard
Clarke. 82 All of that was to change with the attacks of September 11.
The first significant legislative response after the attacks was the
passage of the U.S.A. Patriot Act on October 24, 2001. As in the
United Kingdom where the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security
Act was rushed through the House of Commons in less than one
month, 83 the U.S.A. Patriot Act took less than six weeks to go through
both houses of Congress and become law on October 26, 2001. In the
years since the passage of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, there have been
78.

HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN, supra note 77, at 12.

79. Campbell & Connolly, supra note 40, at 956-57.
80. 9/11 Comm'n Staff, Counterterrorism Before 9/11: National Policy
Coordination, 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 8, in UNDERSTANDING THE
WAR ON TERROR 166 (James F. Hoge Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2005).

81. Id. at 168.
82. Id. at 176-77; CLARKE, supra note 9, at 230.
83. Landman, supra note 4, at 83.
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sixty-five pieces of legislation and executive orders concerning the
fight against terror across a range of policy areas, including border
security and immigration, communications and equipment, critical
infrastructure, cyberterrorism, domestic security, economic and fiscal
issues, first responders, medical and public health issues,
transportation security, and weapons of mass destruction. 84 Of these,
there have been more than ten addressing the domestic security issues
of combating terror (see Table 2), where a significant number of the
human rights issues arise and where, between 2001 and 2006, the
Bush Administration had "more than tripled spending devoted to nondefense homeland security. ' 85 For the 2007 fiscal year, proposed nondefense homeland security expenditure was $41.6 billion with 67%
dedicated to the Department for Homeland Security. 86 To provide an
indication of the overall scale of expenditure in the U.S. prosecution
of the war on terror, Lustick estimates that the average expenditure per
annum is nearly 80% higher than that on education.8 7

84. The U.S. Department of Justice Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination
Group has collated a series of resources related to counter terror in the United States
across different federal bodies and established a website for further information and
training, where all the relevant documentation has been made available,
http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/leg/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
85. LUSTICK, supra note 8, at 21 (quoting Budget of the United States FY
2007, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Management and Budget,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budgetlfy2007/dhs.html (last visited

Sep. 18, 2007)).
86. Budget of the United States FY 2007, Department of Homeland Security,
Office of Management and Budget, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

omb/budget/fy2007/dhs.htmI (last visited Sep. 18, 2007).
87. LUSTICK, supra note 8, at 24.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007

25

Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2007], Art. 9
100 California
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38

Table 2. Legislation and/or Executive Directives for Domestic
Security Since 9/11
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 15 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001)
2. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (U.S.A. Patriot Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.)
3. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.)
4. Designating September 11 as Patriot Day, 36 U.S.C. § 144 (2001)
5. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2005, Pub. L. No.
108-334, 118 Stat. 1298
6. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 50 U.S.C. §§
401,403
7. Notice of Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Persons
Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, Exec. Order No.
13,224, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,921 (Sept. 21, 2004)
8. Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2004, H.R. 2394, 108th Cong.
(2004)
9. Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.)
10. Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect
Americans, Exec. Order No. 13,388, 70 Fed. Reg. 62,023 (Oct. 25, 2005)
11. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355
12. Military Commissions Act of 2006, H.R. 6054, 109th Cong. (2006)

Legislative oversight of executive authority in the United States
and United Kingdom has been markedly different. Despite greater
mechanisms for horizontal accountability in the United States than in
the United Kingdom, Congress has sought to curb very few of the
powers assumed by the President in the post-9/11 period. Sixteen of
the most controversial sections of the U.S.A. Patriot Act contained
sunset clauses for 2005 that, when amended in the form of the Patriot
Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, actually gave
more power to the executive. 88 At its best, the position of Congress
vis- -vis the President has been one of "ambivalence," where it
stepped aside in 2001, re-emerged in 2003-2005 with a new consensus
88. U.S.A. Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 50 U.S.C.).
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on the need to strengthen congressional oversight of the U.S.A. Patriot
Act, and then stepped aside again when the moment for renewing the
act arrived. 89 The new period of divided government may well see the
re-emergence of a Congress that seeks to fortify its oversight of the
battle against terrorism.
In the United Kingdom, the greatest resistance to the Government
came on the issue of the length of time terror suspects can be detained
without charge. In an October 6, 2005 letter to Home Secretary
Charles Clarke, Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police
Andy Hayman outlined the case for the "operational requirements for
an extension to the maximum period of detention without charge to
three months." 90 The briefing note accompanying the ensuing bill
accepted that judicial oversight was crucial, but that police
investigations into terrorist activity that uses sophisticated technology
require extensive forensic expertise that may, in certain circumstances,
require a full ninety-day detention of certain suspects. 9 1 The bill
passed its second reading with a majority of 379 votes, but it faced
fierce opposition during the committee stage, which considers
proposed legislation on a line-by-line basis. The Liberal Democrats
argued for fourteen days in line with existing legislation, the
Conservatives argued for twenty-eight days, while the Government
stuck to its claim that it needed the full ninety days. 92 Ultimately, the
ninety-day detention provision did not carry the vote (twenty-eight
days did), with MPs (Members of Parliament) saying "no" by a
majority of thirty-one votes, where forty-nine of 322 "no" votes came
from the Labour benches. 93 Upon assuming the office of the Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown has called for an increase in the time for
94
detention possibly up to fifty-six days.
Judicial oversight of the executive also has differed markedly
between the two countries. In the United Kingdom, the Law Lords,
89. Jasmine Farrier, The PatriotAct's Institutional Story: More Evidence of
CongressionalAmbivalence, 40 POL. SC. & POL. 93, 93-97 (2007).

90. Liberty U.K., Terrorism Bill: Liberty's Briefing for Second Reading in the
House of Lords 34 (Nov. 2005), www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk.
91. Id.
92. Id. 30.
93. Id.
94. Dominic Casciania, Q&A: Anti-Terrorism Legislation, BBC NEWS, July
25, 2007, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/6729027.stm.
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newly fortified by the 1998 Human Rights Act, have challenged the
Government on the detention without charge of foreign terror suspects
and the subsequent use of control orders. 95 In these instances, the Law
Lords have shown that the Government has acted in ways that are
incompatible with provisions found in the European Convention on
Human Rights and have in many ways asserted a new level of judicial
control over the executive. In the United States, there are mixed
reviews for the activities of the Supreme Court, which has focused its
attention primarily on the detention of terror suspects at Guantdnamo
Bay. The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision in 2004 ruled that detainees
who were U.S. citizens had the right to habeas corpus even if they
were classified as "enemy combatants." 96 The Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
decision in 2006 found that the proposed military commissions for
trying terror suspects violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice
97
and the four Geneva Conventions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi could be seen as a
triumph for international law and human rights, or perhaps it was
more complex. First, Hamdi had been detained for over three years
before the Supreme Court considered his case after successive
decisions by courts determined that the President had the authority to
detain him. Second, only two Justices in the Court's decision
(Justices Stevens and Scalia) insisted that the U.S. Constitution
98
required Hamdi's guilt to be proven in front of a jury of his peers,
while Justice Thomas argued that the president had the power to
"unilaterally decide to detain an individual if the Executive deems this
necessary for the public safety even if he [was] mistaken." 99 For
Bruce Ackerman in Before the Next Attack, it is Justice Thomas's
opinion that is the most shocking, since it seeks to "vindicate the
president's authority unilaterallyto declare an emergency in response
to any perceived threat [imminent or otherwise] . . ." and to detain
indefinitely without charge any U.S. citizen even if the President is

95. A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56,
[2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.).
96. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
97. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 1016 (2006).
98. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 573 (Scalia, J. & Stevens, J., dissenting); ACKERMAN,

supra note 10, at 27.
99. Harmdi, 542 U.S. at 590 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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mistaken.10 0 Overall, Thomas's view is in the minority and Justice
Sandra Day 0' Connor swung the plurality opinion and upheld that
the principle of habeas corpus does apply to Hamdi, but Ackerman
worries nonetheless about the continued precariousness of the Bill of
0
Rights in the United States' '
V. CONCLUSION

This overview of the response to terrorism in the United States
and the United Kingdom shows that the governments in both countries
have pushed against and, in many cases, crossed the "lower boundary"
of rights protections that ought to be in place even if a country faces
an existential threat. Assessments of the terrorist threat suggest that
neither country faces an existential threat to the life of the nation. The
Law Lords' ruling on the detention of foreign terror suspects declared
that the United Kingdom simply had not made the case for derogation
10 2
under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The evidence presented by Lustick and Ackerman suggests that the
United States, like the United Kingdom, does not face an existential
threat. Moreover, the threat may well be greater in the United
Kingdom than in the United States and yet, the political institutions in
the United States have been slow to act in providing increased
oversight for the use of executive power to combat terrorism. Of the
many options open to democracies in responding to terrorism--a
criminal justice model, a war model, or the causes of terrorism
model' 0 3 -Britain has by and large followed a criminal justice model
for dealing with its threat of terror, although there remains a
significant temptation for the criminal justice model to be superseded
by a "security model that is based on fear and suspicion."'10 4

The

United States has adopted a war model that has been based precisely
on such fear and suspicion. The rhetorical construction of the "war on
100.
101.
102.
103.

ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
ECHR, supra note 52, art. 15.
Judith Large, Democracy and Terrorism: The Impact of the Anti, in 2

DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMAN SECURITY: FURTHER READINGS

140, 143

(2005), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/dchs/upload/dchsvol2_sec4
_2.pdf.
104. GEARTY, supra note 71, at 137.
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terror" has prevented adoption of alternative metaphors and has led to
a self-reinforcing cycle of threat perception, policy formulation, and
government expenditure that Lustick labels the "whirlwind" of the
war on terror.' 0 5 It has also allowed the President to exercise his
authority as the Commander-in-Chief in the conduct of this war,
against whom Congress and the Supreme Court have far fewer
mechanisms for constraint.
But how do the developments in both countries address the
themes of this article and the larger debate over the ways in which to
fight terrorism while not undermining a commitment to fundamental
international human rights? First, while the themes of imminence and
proportionality feature throughout A More Secure World, they are
recurring themes in the broader literature on international relations
and international law. Both terms are also relative in the sense that
any perception of threat will always be related to the validity,
reliability, and availability of evidence, while the proportionality of
response is always relative to the threat itself. In his attempt to
measure the terrorist threat in the United States, Lustick cautions us in
line with the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the
"absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence."' 0 6
Lustick's assessment shows that future terrorist attacks are plausible,
but he queries the attention given to the issue relative to other national
priorities, and he queries the enormity of the response.'0 7 Second, in
laying out criteria for an appropriate response that does not undermine
the basic values for which free countries have fought, the normative
evolution of international human rights instruments becomes a useful
resource and reflects at one level a consensus of U.N. member state
views on the need to uphold fundamental rights while combating
terrorism.
The basic premise of the human rights-based approach to
combating terror is that the international law of human rights already
has the criteria established for the conditions under which certain
rights may be curtailed. The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights has compiled a digest of all developments with respect
to protecting human rights while combating terror and has provided a
105. LUSTICK, supra note 8, at 72.
106. Id. at 29 (quoting former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld).
107. Id.
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useful note to the Chair of the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Committee
08
outlining a human rights perspective on counter-terrorism measures.
The principles underlying this advice include legality (preclusion of
all arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement), non-derogability,
necessity and proportionality, non-discrimination, due process and
10 9
rule of law, and the right to seek asylum and/or non-refoulement.
Such an approach to combating terrorism is not a soft option that
disregards security, nor does it claim all rights must be protected at all
times. Rather, it seeks to establish a legal bottom line that recognizes
the need to protect human dignity while providing security. This
approach is entirely consistent with the principles laid out by Dr.
James Jay Caravan, an assistant director and senior research fellow
with the Heritage Foundation, who argued in front of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in January 2007 that "[n]o fundamental liberty
guaranteed by the laws of a sovereign state can be breached or
infringed upon. This should include the protection of human rights
guaranteed by international treaties, which when ratified by the state
have the force of national law."" 0 Such an approach is also wholly
consistent with the February 23, 2007 judgment of the Canadian
Supreme Court striking down a law that allowed the indefinite
detention of terrorism suspects. In that judgment, Chief Justice
Beverly McLachlin wrote "The overarching principle of fundamental
justice that applies here is this: before the state can detain people for
significant periods of time, it must accord them a fair judicial
process."' 1

Such an approach is also consistent with a criminal justice model
for fighting terrorism outlined in this article. Michael German, former
undercover FBI agent, who had infiltrated right-wing and white
108. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Note to the Chair of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee: A Human Rights Perspective on Counter-Terrorism

Measures, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ohchrl.htm
Sept. 21, 2007).
109. Id.

(last visited

110. Balancing Privacy and Security: The Privacy Implications of
Government: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)

(statement of James Jay Carafano, Assistant Director, Heritage Foundation),
availableat http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2438&witid=5948.
111. Charkaoui v. Almrei, [2007] 276 D.L.R. (4th) 594
28 (citing New
Brunswick v. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46).
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supremacist organizations in the United States (of which Timothy
McVeigh, the Oklahoma bomber, was a member) argued strongly for
a criminal justice model of the kind that is consistent with a human
rights-based approach developed here.
By treating terrorists like criminals, we stigmatize them in their
community, while simultaneously validating our own authority.
Open and public trials allow the community to see the terrorist for
the criminal he [or she] is, and successful prosecutions give them
faith the government is protecting them. Judicial review ensures
that the methods used are in accordance with the law, and juries
enforce community standards of fairness. The adversarial process
exposes improper or ineffective law enforcement techniques so they
can be corrected. Checks and balances on government power and
public accountability112promote efficiency by ensuring that only the
guilty are punished.
Too often in the past, concerns over national security have
become "catchall" excuses for systematic violations of human rights.
History shows that there is an easy temptation to abandon the basic
principles that have been essential for the foundation of liberal
societies around the world in the name of combating subversion and
terrorism while attempting to provide increased security. But the
unintended consequences of state action during the current war against
terror will create the outcome most feared by Jefferson: the loss of
security and liberty.

112. German, supra note 40, at 14.
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